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A RAREFIED KIND OF DREAD
David I. Bruck*
There's always anxiety involved in representing death-row
inmates. But when the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a
death-sentenced client's case, nightmare scenarios begin to
loom.
Of course, there's the fear of losing, and in a capital case,
that's no small matter. But if the legal claim that the Supreme
Court has agreed to consider seems very strong, you're likely to
encounter a different, more rarefied kind of dread. After all,
your claim only seems strong because Supreme Court precedent
suggests that you're going to win. But what if the Court took
your case not simply to apply its own precedents (as you claim
the lower courts had boneheadedly refused to do), but to
overrule or weaken them? Then your Supreme Court case will
turn out not only to have been a personal disaster for your client,
* but also to be a historic catastrophe for scores, even hundreds, of
other death row inmates.'
In Skipper v. South Carolina2 the Supreme Court had
granted review (I hoped) to consider whether South Carolina
was violating the Court's most well-established Eighth
Amendment protection-the right to have sentencing juries or
judges consider all the reasons why the death penalty should not
be imposed.3 The South Carolina Supreme Court had held that
* David Bruck, a South Carolina solo practitioner, has specialized in the defense of capital
cases since 1980, and has argued seven such cases in the United States Supreme Court. He
has served as part-time Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel to the federal defender
system nationwide since 1992.
1. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) was such a setback. By repudiating the
rule of Witherspoon v. Ill., 391 U.S. 510 (1968), that any ambiguity about the propriety of
excluding jurors who oppose capital punishment required reversal of the death penalty,
Witt doomed jury-selection claims in capital cases, and contributed to the upsurge in
executions during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
2. 476 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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juries deciding whether to sentence a convicted murderer to
death should not be allowed to consider evidence that he'd make
a well-adjusted, non-violent prisoner if sentenced to life
imprisonment instead. It seemed obvious to me that a jury could
reasonably decide not to impose the death penalty simply
because the defendant had shown that he'd do all right in prison
if allowed to live, but the state supreme court found it just as
obvious that a capital defendant's post-trial behavior was
"irrelevant," and that his jury could be prevented from hearing
evidence bearing on that issue.'
At the time (and for many years before and since) I devoted
most of my solo law practice to defending capital clients at trial
and on appeal. Of course, after I had repeatedly failed to
persuade the state supreme court that its peculiar rule violated
the Lockett principle, I was gratified and excited when the Court
granted my certiorari petition.6 And the cert grant in Skipper was
all the sweeter because exactly six months earlier, the Court had
denied the cert petitions I'd filed on behalf of two other death-
row clients raising the identical claim.7
As I worked on the merits brief, writing and circulating
draft after draft to about a dozen members of an informal
network of capital defense attorneys and law professors around
the country, I tried to reassure myself that the Court had simply
granted review to straighten out an aberrant state court that had
not read its previous death-penalty decisions closely enough.
But those earlier Supreme Court decisions were life-lines to
which hundreds of death-row inmates were clinging. So I
couldn't help brooding over the fact that the more obviously the
state court's decision seemed at odds with Supreme Court
precedent, the more disastrous a Supreme Court loss would be.
A win for my client would help maybe half a dozen other
inmates. But a loss would greatly weaken one of the few
constitutional protections-the right to present mitigating
4. State v. Koon, 298 S.E.2d 769, 773-774 (S.C. 1982).
5. See id.; State v. Elmore, 332 S.E.2d 762 (S.C. 1985); State v. Koon, 328 S.E.2d 625
(S.C. 1985); State v. Chaffee, 328 S.E.2d 464 (S.C. 1984); State v. Patterson, 327 S.E.2d
650 (S.C. 1984).
6. Skipper v. S.C., 474 U.S. 900 (1985).
7. Patterson v. S.C., Koon v. S.C., 471 U.S. 1036 (1985) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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evidence-that the Supreme Court had not already watered
down.
What's more, just six weeks before the Skipper argument, I
had seen first-hand what it means to lose a capital case. Terry
Roach was a mentally impaired South Carolina prisoner who'd
been sentenced to death for his part in two murders committed
when he was 17.8 I had not been one of his lawyers, but I spent
the final six hours keeping him company before he was
electrocuted early on the morning of January 10, 1986. After his
body had been hoisted from the electric chair onto a gurney and
rolled out of the death chamber, I took a small bundle of his
belongings (a comb, a Bible, some flip-flops) to his family, who
had been waiting in a borrowed apartment a few miles from the
prison. Anyone who doubts that there are innocent victims on
both sides of every death-penalty case would have been
convinced by the scene of stunned devastation that greeted me
that morning.
So as the Supreme Court argument approached, I began to
feel a little like someone who'd staked his family's life savings
on a risky stock in hopes of a three-percent return. I was
reasonably sure the Court would rule for my client. But for
everyone except him and his family, a loss would hurt a lot more
than a win would help. Of course a lawyer puts his own client
first, but one can't (and shouldn't) handle a death-penalty case
in the Supreme Court without giving a lot of thought to how
many people will be hurt (killed, actually) if the case goes bad.
Once the briefs were done, the only way to channel all that
anxiety into something constructive was to do a couple of moot
argument sessions. I doubted that anything I said or didn't say at
oral argument was likely to affect the outcome; whatever the
Court's reason for granting review was probably how the case
would come out. But I wasn't going to turn down a chance to get
grilled by some of the most experienced capital litigators and
appellate advocates in the country (including several former
Supreme Court law clerks), and after two such sessions, I'd had
my chance to stammer through responses to just about every
question that would come up during argument before the Court.
8. Roach v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 1039 (1986) (Brennan & Marshal, JJ., dissenting from
denial of stay).
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February 24, 1986, was a day of brilliant sunshine on newly
fallen snow. Shoes freshly shined, I picked my way through the
drifts and slush outside the Court, hoping that the unexpected
snowfall didn't foreshadow any other obstacles that I'd failed to
foresee.
Nowadays, the Clerk, William Suter, conducts a helpful
(and reassuring) orientation cum pep-talk for all arguing counsel
just after nine o'clock in the lawyer's lounge off the Courtroom.
But in the mid-1980s, counsel's only initiation was a sign-in at
the Clerk's ground-floor office, followed by a brief introduction
to Mr. Spaniol, then the Clerk of the Court, and as much small-
talk as the Clerk and eight nervous lawyers on both sides of four
unrelated cases could manage (which, as I recall, wasn't much).
Then it was on into the Courtroom, where (since I had the third
argument), my co-counsel Jack Boger and I waited till about
11:00 to take our places at the "on-deck" table on the
petitioner's side of the aisle.
The longest part of the wait was the last minute or so. As
counsel for the petitioner, I'd been instructed to take my place at
the podium and then to stand and wait for as long as it took the
Courtroom to quiet down after the previous case, at which point
the Chief Justice would recognize me and I could begin. I was
surprised at how intimate the courtroom seemed: The lawyers
are just a few feet from the bench and the Justices, and I stood
and gazed up at the Chief Justice in a state of suspended
animation for what seemed like a very long time. It reminded me
of the ski racing I'd done as a kid, standing in the gate waiting
for the signal at the top of the slalom course. The trick, our
coach had told us, was not to forget to breathe. So I took deep
breaths until Chief Justice Burger intoned in his deep baritone
voice, "We will hear arguments now in Skipper against South
Carolina. Mr. Bruck, I think you may proceed when you are
ready."
After that, it was a pretty easy run. The state had set up
some procedural defenses rather than engage the merits of the
South Carolina rule at issue, so I plodded through those, helped
by some gentle questioning from Justice O'Connor. At one point
I started to insist that there were two things wrong with the
state's procedural argument, and the first thing was ....
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"That it is wrong," Justice White interjected with a smile.
There was laughter in the courtroom behind me, and I knew that
this was not going to be nearly as hard as I'd feared.
Ten minutes into my argument, the Court recessed for its
one-hour lunch break. The sensation was like a time-out in the
middle of an Olympic bobsled run. Nothing could provide any
greater advantage to one side in a Supreme Court argument. (It's
an advantage that no one gets anymore, because with only half
as many cases on the Court's current argument calendar as in the
mid-1980s, the Court almost never hears more than two
arguments on any given day, and both arguments are almost
always over by lunch.) Now I had a whole hour to sit with Jack
Boger (a brilliant lawyer and gentle soul who then directed the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Project), and
get his take on how things were going (fine, he thought) and
whether I'd answered the Chief's hypothetical questions well
enough. By the time the argument resumed, I felt sure the votes
were there to reverse, and the rest of my half hour felt like a
high-powered but enjoyable (albeit, on my side, slightly manic)
conversation with the Justices.
After the argument was over, Jack and I headed out into the
first floor hallway where there were congratulations to be had
and some decompressing to do, while Court officers patiently
but firmly tried to get everyone quieted down and moving
towards the exits. But as soon as I could, I needed to get to a pay
phone to call my client and let him know how the argument had
gone.
The officers on South Carolina's death row had assured me
that they'd get Ronnie Skipper to the phone when I called from
Washington, and when the time came, they did. I tried not to be
overconfident in predicting the outcome, and I'd watched
enough Supreme Court arguments by then to know that Justices'
questions and comments don't always reveal how a case will
turn out. But this argument had gone well, and while I no longer
remember exactly what we said, I must have sounded reassured,
and I know that I tried to be reassuring.
What I do recall was the sense of incongruity between the
majesty and pageantry of the Supreme Court proceedings and
the dingy squalor of the death-row cell-block on the other end of
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the line. It was hard to believe that one could be so intimately
connected to the other.
My client's mother had come to Washington for the
argument, and I felt almost embarrassed that she was there to
witness the elegant, dignified spectacle to which the ruinous
calamity of her son's crime and sentence had somehow given
rise. I don't encourage family members of condemned clients to
attend appellate arguments, because I worry about how it must
feel to realize that a son's or a brother's fate turns on the sorts of
arcane legal points that are usually at issue. But this time it
turned out okay, because when the argument was over and we
headed out into the snowy city, we all felt pretty sure that her
son was going to get another chance at life.9 What's more, after
having endured a South Carolina prosecutor's shouting and
hollering about how Ronnie ought to die, and a jury agreeing,
now she'd seen the Supreme Court of the United States calmly
considering whether he had been treated fairly, and I suppose
there must have been some comfort in that.
9. Sure enough, the Court unanimously reversed the death sentence nine weeks later,
Justice White's opinion for the majority sustaining both the Eighth Amendment and due
process claims. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 2-9. Justice Powell's concurrence, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist, rejected the Eighth Amendment claim but agreed that the
death sentence had been obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 9-15
(Powell, J., Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring). That November, Ronnie Skipper
was re-sentenced to life imprisonment by a South Carolina court.
